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'In the Public Interest':
The Responsibilities and Rights of
Government Lawyers
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON *
White considerable thought and effort have been put into exploring and fixing the ethical
rights and professional responsibilities of private Lawyers, tittle energy has been directed
towards defining and defending the role and duties of government lawyers. As a result, the
traditional understanding seems to be that government lawyers are to consider themselves
as being under the same regimen and restrictions as their private counterparts. After
criticizing this default approach, the article offers a fresh evaluation of what is different
about the rote of government lawyers and develops a more appropriate model for thinking
about their professional responsibilities and ethical privileges. The central thrust of the
article is the effort to appreciate legal ethics and professional responsibility as part of a
larger democratic understanding of law and justice.
QueLue que soit Ia somme de r6flexion et d'effort consacr~e 6 explorer et 6 fixer Les droits
6thiques et les responsabilit6s professionnelles des avocats prives, on a consacr6 peu de
temps 6 d6finir et 6 d6fendre le r6le et Les devoirs des avocats du gouvernement. Par
cons~quent, on s'accorde traditionnellement 6 dire que Les avocats du gouvernement
doivent consid6rer qu'its reltvent du mame r~gime et respectent Les mimes restrictions
que leurs homologues priv~s. Apr~s avoir critiqu6 cette <<approche par d~faut -. ['article
offre une 6valuation neuve des diff~rences sur le plan du r6le des avocats du
gouvernement. Itd~veloppe un mod@le plus appropri6 de r6flexion au sujet de teurs
responsabiLit6s professionnelles et de teurs privileges 6thiques. L'argument central de cet
article fait ressortir [effort d'appr6cier Les 6thiques juridiques et [a responsabilit6
professionnelte dans le cadre dune perception d~mocratique large du droit et de [ajustice.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

GOVERNMENT LAWYERS ARE the orphans of legal ethics. While considerable
thought and effort have been put into exploring and fixing the ethical rights
and professional responsibilities of private lawyers, little energy has been
directed towards defining and defending the role and duties of government
lawyers. Not only do the various official codes of professional conduct remain
almost silent in their applicability to government lawyers, there is also a paucity
of academic literature and professional commentary about how these lawyers
are supposed to approach their working obligations and institutional
imperatives. As a result, the traditional understanding seems to be that
government lawyers are to consider themselves subject to the same regimen and
restrictions as their private counterparts. Yet this default approach is obviously
wanting in many regards. In particular, it fails to appreciate the important
differences between the functions of government lawyers and private lawyers
and, therefore, fails to recognize that the ethical duties and professional
obligations imposed on private lawyers do not transfer easily or usefully to the
different context of government lawyers. Consequently, as the number and
importance of government lawyers continue to grow, it is more than timely to
offer a fresh evaluation of what is different about the role of government
lawyers and to develop a more appropriate model for thinking about their
professional responsibilities and ethical privileges. This short article is an
attempt to begin that important theoretical task.
The central thrust of this article sees legal ethics and professional
responsibility as part of a larger democratic understanding of law and justice.
While a democratic focus has commanded the attention of most commentators
when it comes to assessing the appropriate role of judges in fulfilling their
common law and constitutional duties, there has been almost no corresponding
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democratic concern with the professional role of lawyers.' The relationship
between democracy and legal ethics tends to be stated implicitly and viewed as
secondary, even though many similar dilemmas and challenges arise in both the
lawyering context and the adjudication realm. Accordingly, I make an initial
foray into this neglected field and put a democratic sensibility at the heart of
my approach to refraining the responsibilities of government. After exploring
the democratic basis for the traditional private model of ethical lawyering, I
look to how the concept of the "public interest" might be relied on to
illuminate the context in which government lawyers work and the implications
this has for their ethical obligations. Of course, democracy is one of the most
contested terms in the legal and political lexicon, having almost as many
meanings as there are democrats. While it is important to be sensitive to such
divisions of opinion, this ought not to present an insuperable obstacle to
grounding some general and broad observations about the role and
responsibilities of government lawyers in a democratic society. Moreover, the
application of such an approach to legal ethics recommends that some
traditional understandings of government lawyers' ethical duties and
professional constraints (e.g., zealous advocacy and confidentiality) may need to
be reformulated and reworked.
II. DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL ETHICS
Although there is much debate and disagreement over democracy's precise
meaning and requirements, its core commitment is to the understanding that
people should rule over themselves. Treated as having procedural (e.g.,
participation, voting) and substantive (e.g., security, welfare) dimensions, albeit
both heavily contested, strong democracy is committed to the idea and practice
that governance is to be for the people and, as importantly, by the people.
However, the realities of modern states and large-scale governance mean that
democratic proponents must be prepared to compromise on some of
democracy's more idealistic aspirations if they are to be implemented in an

1.

Of course, the democratic focus on adjudication has not led to any agreement on what
adjudication is and ought to be about. Nevertheless, there is almost universal agreement that
the effort to understand adjudication in democratic terms is one of the compelling mandates
of judicial scholarship. See e.g. Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial:JudicialActivism or
DemocraticDialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001).
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efficient and efficacious manner. Like most political theories, therefore,
democracy focuses on the distribution and exercise of power. Democrats are
concerned less with power in itself and more with the basis on which it is
allocated, with how it is exercised, and with the use to which it is put. At
bottom, democracy seems to involve a recognition that power should be
devolved and shared, and when that is not practicable, that power be exercised
by those democratically authorized to do so with responsibility and accountability.
Consequently, modern democratic governance effects a practical compromise
by establishing a system of governance that is at least for the people if it is not
always by the people. It does this by ensuring a division of powers and
responsibilities among institutions and actors so that the allocation and exercise
of power is diffuse, disciplined, conditional, temporary, and accountable. The
basic gamble is that although a gap between the rulers and the ruled and
between the powerful and the powerless will persist, the smaller the gap and the
better its means of scrutiny, the more democratic the society will be.'
However, if democracy is to make good on its emancipatory promise, it
must be willing to confront and eradicate abuses of power from whatever source
they arise. From a citizen's perspective, it surely makes little difference whether
the concentration of power and its exercise is technically public or private in
origin. In particular, sustained efforts must be made to ensure that power is not
held by a small group of elites and exercised with little regard to the interests of
others. In an important sense, the key contemporary challenge remains as much
about whether the majority will ride roughshod over the minority as whether a
privileged minority-be it the monied few, the judicial aristocracy, the political
elite, the bureaucratic oligarchy, the corporate nabobs or, of course, the legal
profession-will ride roughshod over the majority. Democracy is devoted to
exerting a centrifugal rather than centripetal influence on power. Too often,
democracy and its institutions have been hijacked by the elite, even if claiming
to speak and act for the interests of all Canadians. This is more a form of
benevolent despotism which, no matter how benevolent, remains despotic and
cannot be democratic in operation or effect. Accordingly, democracy demands
neither that the majority oppress the minority nor that the minority rule over
the majority. Both are anathema to the democrat.

2.

For my own general stance on democracy, see Allan C. Hutchinson, The Companies We
Keep: CorporateGovernance in a DemocraticSociety (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 59-83.
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It is against this backdrop that the present models of legal ethics and
professional responsibility have developed. As part of a larger democratic
compact, the existence of a large and powerful legal profession presents both a
boost and a threat to the proper establishment and maintenance of democratic
governance. On the one hand, a strong and forceful legal profession is a vital
resource in holding governments to democratic account and guaranteeing that
all citizens are empowered by vigorous representation in their dealings with
governing bodies and other powerful elites. This task pushes towards a variety
of rules and regulations which protect the legal profession's independence and
entitle it to act as a bulwark between state oppression and citizens' freedom. On
the other hand, in fulfilling that essential democratic task, there is a real danger
that the legal profession will itself become an elite centre of power which will
put its own interests ahead of those of its clients and that will fail to serve the
broader public interest. This possibility suggests that a range of mechanisms
will need to be put in place to ensure that the legal profession is held
accountable to the public at large, and that its resources and prestige are not
hijacked by any one segment of society. The challenge is to craft a set of
regulatory, legal, and ethical arrangements that allow and require members of
the profession to act in a way that satisfies the demands of democracy and the
public interest by contributing to and facilitating the devolution and
accountability of power. 3
The underlying and animating model of the ethical lawyer is as a "special
purpose friend" to his or her clients.' As super-technocrats, lawyers are
considered to possess a cultivated set of talents and techniques which they are
supposed to deploy for the sole advantage of the people and private institutions
who hire them. Positioned between the state and its citizenry, the legal
profession is there to ensure that people are aware of their rights and are able to
rely on them in dealing with the state or other private actors. As such, lawyers

3.

I offer a very stylized and schematic account of the standard model of ethical lawyering. The
fact that this model has severe limitations (e.g., insensitivity to the different needs of
wealthier and poorer people) and is open to strong criticisms (e.g., differential access to legal
services) is beyond the immediate scope of this paper. For a fuller discussion and a critical
account, see Allan C. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and ProfessionalResponsibility, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) at 19-59.

4.

Charles Fried, "Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation"
(1976) 85 Yale L.J. 1060.
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are to regard themselves as being neutral on the substance and form of the law
as well as on their clients' agendas and interests. Not only is there no need for
lawyers to act in solidarity with their clients' stance, but there are important
political and moral reasons why lawyers should be consciously indifferent to
their clients' causes and goals. This is because the relationship between lawyers
and clients is built upon trust and respect: clients are to trust lawyers to act in
the clients' best interests and, in return, lawyers will respect the clients'
autonomy and interests. Within a largely adversarial system, lawyers' primary
obligations are to their clients. While it is now excessive to suggest that they are
"required to treat outsiders as if they were barbarians and enemies," 5 lawyers are
expected to be single-minded in their devotion to their clients' cause and to use
whatever legitimate means are at their disposal to advance it.
The most obvious example of this uncompromising effort to act as a special
friend in an adversarial setting is the traditionally conceived role and
responsibilities of the criminal defence counsel. As accused individuals, citizens
are pitted against the state, with all its resources and power, and are in urgent
need of a friend who is always and unconditionally on their side. Charged with
the task of raising a reasonable doubt, criminal lawyers are expected to commit
themselves to doing all they can to ensure that their client is acquitted and that
the state does not exercise its powers of punishment without respecting the
rights of those it proceeds against, whether they are guilty or innocent. Of
course, not all or even most lawyering is concerned with the criminal justice
system. However, the criminal defence model holds great (and perhaps too
much) theoretical sway in defining the basis and limits of lawyers' ethical role
generally. The strict adversarial ethic has been largely transposed to the noncriminal law setting so that private lawyers are expected to adhere to a similar
partisan role in representing their clients. Within such an account of lawyers in
a democratic society, it will be apparent that lawyers are thought to advance the
public interest by standing squarely in the citizens' corner and promoting or
protecting their private interests against the government or against other
citizens, in accordance with existing law and policy. As such, although this
professional role is decidedly amoral, in that lawyers are not expected or
required to take up their clients' interests and causes as their own or to defend
them morally, it does have a strong moral and democratic underpinning.
5.

Charles P. Curtis, "The Ethics of Advocacy" (1951) 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3 at 5.

HUTCHINSON, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

111

Under this traditional model of lawyering, the basic contours of the lawyerclient relationship take on a fairly obvious shape and substance. Apart from any
general contractual obligations or tortious duties owed to the client, the lawyer is
considered to be in a fiduciary relationship with the client. Consequently, lawyers
are obligated to ensure that they act as zealous partisans on behalf of their clients,
demonstrate undivided loyalty to and are entirely candid with their clients, avoid
conflicts of interest, and give the highest confidentiality to their clients'
communications. Moreover, it is generally accepted that one lawyer's client is
considered to be the client of all the members in the retained lawyer's firm and,
therefore, will be entitled to the same duties and obligations from all those
lawyers as the circumstances allow: "it is the firm, not just the individual lawyer,
that owes a fiduciary duty to its clients."6 Each of these obligations flows from the
basic democratic account of professional roles and responsibilities. However, as
part of the general compromise implicit in the democratic account, there are
occasions on which lawyers must temper their zealous advocacy and loyalty in the
public interest. Lawyers' adversarial zeal on behalf of clients is mitigated not only
by competing duties to the courts (e.g., not to mislead) and the public (e.g.,
disclosure of future serious crimes), but also by the basic duty to one's self to be
honest and honourable. Nevertheless, lawyers do owe special duties to their
clients and are both entitled, and obliged, to give those interests priority in any
clash with the interests of others. While those other interests might still count,
they count for much less and, except in extraordinary circumstances, only when
they are not in direct conflict with the interests of the lawyer's clients!
III. GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Of course, not all lawyers practice in the same circumstances. Indeed, it can be
persuasively argued that it is no longer accurate or useful to talk about a
6.

R. v. Neil, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 631 at para. 29. See also Allan C. Hutchinson, "Who are
'Clients'? (And Why it Matters)" (2005) 84 Can. Bar Rev. 411.

7.

There is, of course, a less strict and softer interpretation of this traditional model which,
although still retaining the primary duties of loyalty, zealous advocacy, and confidentiality,
contends that unconditional loyalty to clients' interests will result in lawyers facilitating
substantive social injustice. Instead, it places more emphasis on the broader secondary duties
of the lawyer to the court and to third parties. See David Luban, Lawyers andJustice: An
EthicalStudy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). See also William H. Simon, The
PracticeofJustice: A Theory of Lauyers'Ethics(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
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Canadian legal profession or a typical Canadian lawyer. 8 Instead, there is now a
multiplicity of roles and positions, ranging from the solo practice to the large
corporate bureaucracy to the small partnership to government. The days of the
fungible lawyer or legal practice are long gone. A diverse group of lawyers is
engaged in a wide variety of practices. Who practises law (men and women,
young and old, black and white, domestic and foreign, etc.), where they do it
(e.g., office towers, shopping malls, clinics, home basements, government
offices, mobile vans), how they do it (with entrepreneurial flair, part-time, on a
shoestring, as big business, etc.), who they do it for (e.g., Aboriginal people, rich
individuals, international conglomerates, homeless persons, small businesses),
and what they do it for (e.g., subsistence income, personal satisfaction,
enormous income, social prestige, political influence) have all gone through a
transformation. It might be thought, therefore, that this changing landscape of
professional practice would have significant implications for how the rules and
models of ethical lawyering apply: different kinds of lawyers might be treated
differently in terms of the ethical obligations placed upon them and the
professional expectations demanded of them. Whether and how this will be
done has not yet become clear.
Government lawyers-those who are employed by or sub-contracted to
work for federal, provincial, or local governments, related agencies, and public
bodies-are largely held to the same ethical standards and requirements as
private lawyers. The almost complete silence of the various regulatory codes on
the role and responsibilities of government lawyers can be reasonably assumed
to recommend that there are no substantially different expectations of
government lawyers. In a rare explicit acknowledgement of a possible
distinction between the roles of private lawyers and government lawyers, the
Code of Professional Conduct states that lawyers in public office must continue to
maintain the same high standards expected of lawyers in private practice
because their position "is in the public eye" and, therefore, "the legal profession
can more readily be brought into disrepute" by misconduct Although
8.

Harry W. Arthurs, "Lawyering in Canada in the 21st Century" (1996) 15 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 202.

9.

Canadian Bar Association, Code of ProfessionalConduct,c. 10, commentary, C. 1 [CBA,
Code of Professional Conduct). This more likely applies only to lawyers in elected office, but it
can reasonably extend to government lawyers generally, even though it says and demands
very little of them.
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American courts have occasionally placed a higher standard on government
lawyers, Canadian courts have refused to hold government lawyers to a higher
standard than lawyers in private practice. Indeed, one court has gone so far to
say that "all lawyers ... are subject to the same single high standard of
professional conduct" and that "it is not flattering to [other] lawyers ... to say
that most of them are held to a lower standard of professional conduct than
government lawyers."'0 The most that seems to be conceded is that even though
the general rules of professional conduct apply equally to government lawyers,
there needs to be some adjustment and modest refinement in their application
to those different situations which confront government lawyers.
Much of the day-to-day work done by government lawyers can be
reasonably compared to that of private lawyers: they advise persons and
institutions on existing laws and regulations, develop effective legal strategies,
and then implement and vary those strategies as circumstances demand.
However, this comparison only holds at a very superficial level. There is little
similarity between the work and situation of a solo practitioner or small
partnership lawyer in a small town and that of a federal Department of Justice
litigator. The overall context in which government lawyers operate is markedly
different from that of private practice. Government lawyers are charged with
the task of acting on behalf of government and placing the public interest ahead
of the interests of any particular individual; there are many statutory,
constitutional, and regulatory initiatives that impinge upon government
lawyers. Private lawyers do not need to be directly, but only tangentially,
concerned with the public interest (or, more accurately, attention to the clients'
private needs is largely considered to be advancing the public interest). They
also have a greater range of discretion in both whether they accept certain files
or clients and under what circumstances they are prepared to withdraw from
cases or discontinue their clients' representation. Because government lawyers

10.

Everingham v. Ontario (1992), 8 O.R. (3d) 121 at para. 18 (Div. Ct.). The CBA also states
that "the lawyer who holds public office should, in the discharge of official duties, adhere to
standards as high as those that these rules require of a lawyer in the practice of law." See
CBA, Code of ProfessionalConduct,ibid., r. 10. See also Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules
ofProfessionalConduct, r. 6. However, I will not deal with the particular responsibilities and
duties of elected officials, like the Attorney General or Minister of Justice. See Kent Roach,
"Not Just the Government's Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender of the Rule of Law"
(2006) 31 Queen's L.J. 598.
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are both legal practitioners and employees, they are more restricted in their
options. However, in this one regard at least, government lawyers are in not so
different a position from junior associates in large metropolitan law firms: they
have little choice about who they represent, what files they take, and how they
manage those files. Both the large firm lawyer and the government lawyer must
follow instructions in all ethical and professional matters unless they are
prepared to take an employment-threatening stance."
The significant difference between private lawyers and government lawyers
is that the latter have a much greater obligation to consider the public interest
in their decisions and dealings with others than the former. This is particularly
so in the case of the criminal prosecutor. Because prosecutors fulfill a "public
function," it must be carried out "fairly and dispassionately."' 2 Consequently,
the duty of prosecutors is not to seek convictions, but to adopt an almost quasijudicial obligation which excludes any notion of winning or losing. The
prosecutor's duty "is not to seek a conviction," but to present all "credible" and
"relevant" evidence to the court so "that justice may be done through a fair
trial." 3 As such, prosecutors operate in a dual capacity: as a partisan advocate
(i.e., they must seek convictions for the guilty) and as a court administrator
(i.e., guard against the wrongful convictions of the innocent). These different
roles and responsibilities were made clear by Justice Rand in Boucher
It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to
obtain a conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible

evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all
available legal proof of the facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to
is a
its legitimate strength, but it must also be done fairly. The role of prosecutor ...
matter of public duty [and] there can be none charged with greater personal
responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity,
the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings.14

It might also be contended that in the same way that criminal lawyers can
be considered to be in a different position from private lawyers, government
lawyers might also be viewed generally as operating in a significantly different
11.

I will pursue this important point in Part V, below.

12.

CBA, Code of ProfessionalConduct, supra note 9, c. 9, commentary, s. 9.

13. Ibid.
14.

R. v. Boucher, [1955] S.C.R.16 at para. 26 [Boucher]. See also R.v.Trochym, [2007] 1
S.C.R. 239.
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context than their prosecutorial colleagues. Yet this contention seems less
convincing-the differences between criminal lawyers and private lawyers are
much more significant than those between government lawyers generally and
prosecution lawyers specifically: prosecution lawyers are a species of
government lawyers, not an entirely different genus. While they do not fulfill
exactly the same roles or assume exactly the same obligations, government
lawyers and prosecution lawyers both share a common duty to advance the
public interest as a direct and explicit undertaking. Indeed, it can be argued
that all government lawyers, including prosecution lawyers, are government
bureaucrats first and lawyers only second. Each of them is involved in the
important task of formulating and implementing government policy within a
specified and sophisticated structure of constitutional,
legislative,
administrative, and judicial requirements. This difference in roles and
responsibilities can be analogized to the division between the laws and
regulations which govern the operation and orientation of private and public
bodies generally. The development of constitutional and administrative law has
been marked by the approved imperative to hold public actors to different
standards of conduct and accountability than their private counterparts.'"
Informed by a distinctly democratic sensibility and commitment to the public
interest, courts have required public bodies to look to a broader set of interests
than their own parochial and partisan concerns in determining the most
appropriate and reasonable course of action to be followed. In short, like the
bodies that they serve and represent, government lawyers are different in that
they are expected to have a more expansive and more public appreciation of
their roles and responsibilities than their private counterparts.
IV. IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
It can be insisted, therefore, without too much serious resistance, that
government lawyers are differently situated than private lawyers in that their
work takes place more directly in the immediate field of the public interest.
However, because there are so many competing notions of what comprises the
public interest and how it should apply in particular situations, it is a notoriously
15.

See e.g. Peter W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 5th ed. (Scarborough: Thomson
Canada, 2006). See also David Phillip Jones & Anne S. de Villars, Principlesof
Administrative Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough: Thomson Canada, 2004).
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difficult and contested task to designate what ends are in the public interest and
what means-which must also be consistent with the public interest-are best
pursued to realize those ends. There is no certainty as to what those values are
and even less on what they demand in particular situations: democracy is
premised on the belief that such determinations are inherently political and are
best made by the people themselves. However, in seeking to fix and frame the
ethical obligations and professional responsibilities of government lawyers,
there is no compelling need to enter into that sprawling debate in any definitive
or exhaustive way. The more modest and pertinent question concerns the role
and responsibilities that government lawyers do and should have in explicating
or contributing to the government's duty to act in the public interest.
Fortunately, reference back to a democratic appreciation of the public interest
can point to possible answers to that central quandary.
In any populous and contemporary society, there will have to be certain
trade-offs in how the government works and how power is allocated and
exercised. Democracy is no exception. While it will be important to maximize
the circumstances and settings in which popular participation occurs, there will
be limits on how this can be done. Problems of scale and efficacy suggest that
compromises will need to be made. For instance, it must be determined how
many people will be involved in the general governance and decision-making
process of society, for how long they will be involved, and by what method they
will be selected and/or removed. However, in settling on the kind and manner
of such compromises, it will be important to make such trade-offs within a
democratic account of governance and not with a democratic account of
governance. This means that while it will be necessary to confer public power
on some persons over others at times, the role of those people presently out of
power will not be exhausted by occasional electoral involvement; democracy is a
mode of government by the people as well as for them. Even citizens who are
not involved in government and public-interest decision making have a
responsibility to keep a watchful eye on those in power and to hold them
accountable. As such, both those in power and those out of power have
mutually-reinforcing duties and obligations to advance and maintain the
democratic project. Accordingly, a democratic approach to the problems of
the allocation and exercise of power will likely work along two axes:
participation and accountability.
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The participatory imperative is intended to maximize the opportunities not
only for popular involvement in decision making and policy implementation,
but also for ultimate responsibility for those tasks. Democracy is not intended
to be a supplement to or cover for rule by an expert elite. While elected officials
would do well to seek the advice of experts, it is entirely their choice as to
whether they follow that advice. Of course, because these political delegates are
given such extensive power and responsibility, an accountability check becomes
essential; democracy must guard against the power-hogging tendencies of
elected officials as much as any other group. This gives rise to the accountability
imperative: elected officials must be answerable to the other citizens who they
represent and on whose behalf they act. Along with the usual electoral processes
and more discipline-oriented measures, it will be important to ensure that the
practice of democratic governance is as open and transparent as possible.
Without the necessary information about what government decisions are made
and how they are made, the citizenry will be unable to exercise its own
democratic responsibilities 'and rights in overseeing public officials and in
deciding whether to re-elect them. Consequently, the role of public officials
involves a democratic quid pro quo. While those in power by virtue of the
extant democratic processes might obtain certain temporary privileges and
priorities, they can also expect to be placed under much greater scrutiny and
appraisal than other persons in exercising that power. Quite simply, the accrual
of public power carries with it the moral and institutional obligation to exercise
it in the public interest and to be seen to do so. By relying on both participation
and accountability, the necessary trade-offs in establishing genuine democratic
governance in large societies can be made within rather than with democracy.
This democratic understanding of the allocation and exercise of public
power recommends some particular responses to the challenge of determining
the role and responsibilities of government lawyers. As regards zealous advocacy
and confidentiality, such a democratic sensibility seems to pull in two different
ethical directions: it favours close adherence to the traditional model of private
lawyering in some instances and deviations from it in others. For instance, as
regards zealous advocacy, it seems to suggest that insofar as government lawyers
are expected or directed to act in the public interest, they will take their lead
from their political superiors and defer to such officials on what the public
interest demands in deciding on policy and implementing it. However, as
regards confidentiality, although they will not be permitted to act wantonly or
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capriciously, they will be under a less onerous obligation to keep work-related
communications and information confidential. Indeed, when assessed from the
public interest, government lawyers might well have a professional duty in some
circumstances to disclose publicly certain communications and information.
Government lawyers will determine their moral compass by the requirements of
maintaining a loyal and keen friendship not with their political superiors or
government as such, but with the public interest more generally. Public officials
are entitled to loyalty from government lawyers not directly, but by virtue of their
roles as the democratic guardians of the public interest. Both of these positions on
zealous advocacy and confidentiality need further elaboration and justification.
V. ZEALOUS ADVOCACY
At the heart of private lawyers' duty of loyalty to their clients is the obligation
to act as their zealous advocate. This demands a single-minded focus on clients'
interests. As Lord Brougham declaimed in defending the English queen against
treason charges, the lawyer's duty is "to save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and ... in performing
this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he
may bring upon others."1 Although that degree of passionate commitment
might not be required today, it is only in exceptional and relatively extreme
circumstances that lawyers are expected to curb their unconditional enthusiasm
for their clients' interests in the name of the public interest. Moreover, even if
this standard were to be applied to government lawyers, it would demand
certain concessions. Lord Brougham's exhortation that lawyers must be
prepared to separate "the duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, and cast]
them, if need be, to the wind" and to "go on reckless of the consequences,
though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion" 7
hardly fits easily with the role of the modern government lawyer. Presumably in
acting in the public interest, government lawyers are to advocate on behalf of
the government, not against it, and will be sensitive to the country's fate.
Whether by design or default, government lawyers will have an important
role to play in thinking through and answering contentious and crucial matters

16.

J. Nightingale, ed., Trialof Queen Caroline,vol. 2 (London: J. Robins & Co., 1821) at 8.

17.
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about what ends and means are in the public interest. It is difficult to take
seriously any suggestion that government lawyers should have no legitimate or
effective role at all in such policy formation and implementation. Government
lawyers can and should make a valuable contribution in shaping discussion
about what represents the public interest in any particular instance. However,
the crucial issue is who gets to determine what is in the public interest when
governments lawyers disagree or, more pertinently, when government lawyers
and their political and/or elected superiors disagree. It is difficult to make a
strong claim that government lawyers should have the final and determinative
call on what is in the public interest under a strictly democratic model of good
governance and ethical lawyering. It would be undemocratic and perhaps even
anti-democratic for government lawyers to be authorized by the legal profession
as a matter of ethical discretion or professional responsibility to put their own
views on the public interest ahead of the views of public officials. As an elite
group of expert professionals, lawyers have no better and perhaps worse claims
to determine what is in the public interest than elected officials, or even citizens
generally. As John Hart Ely might have said, "we may grant until we're blue in
the face that [elected officials] aren't wholly democratic, but that isn't going to
make [lawyers] more democratic than [elected officials]." 8 As such, a commitment
to democracy strongly recommends that aside from proposed courses of criminal
or illegal conduct, government lawyers should not have any kind of veto over
such determinations of the public interest by elected officials or political
superiors. Indeed, after exhausting all opportunities for persuasion and discussion,
government lawyers must advance the determined goals or strategies with
customary enthusiasm or give up their position. Under any account of legal ethics
or public interest, there is simply no role for half-hearted professional advocacy.
In developing and defending this general stance, there are two related
aspects of the current understanding about lawyers' professional responsibilities

18. Although this is a bastardized versiot of Ely's original quote that "we may grant until we're
blue in the face that legislatures aren't wholly democratic, but that isn't going to make courts
more democratic than legislatures," it is intended to be in the.spirit of Ely's original quote.
See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust:A Theory ofJudicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1980) at 67. For views along a similar line, see Geoffrey Miller, "Government
Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances" (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1293 at
1294. See also Peter L. Strauss, "The Internal Relations of Government: Cautionary Tales
From Inside the Black Box" (1998) 61 Law & Contemp. Probs. 155 at 156-57.
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that can be profitably examined: client identity generally and corporate
representation specifically. First, it might be useful to come at this problem as if
government lawyers are part of a traditional lawyer-client relationship. This
would initially demand some appreciation of the identity of the client that they
are intended to serve. This is by no means obvious. There are a number of
candidates: the government as a whole; the branch of government in which the
lawyer is employed (i.e., executive, legislative, or judicial); the particular agency
or department in which the lawyer works; the responsible officers who make
decisions for the agency; and the public interest itself." Because the professional
codes seem to assume that government lawyers will be bound by similar ethical
duties as their private counterparts, they have little if anything to say on this
important choice between the likely alternatives. However, the Alberta Code
does state that "the client of a lawyer employed by the government is the
government itself and not a board, agency, minister or Crown corporation.""
Accordingly, even if the government, broadly understood, is the client or even
if it is something as abstract as the public interest itself, the more pertinent
question is not "who is the client?" but "who gets to speak on the client's
behalf?" In either case, it seems unlikely that government lawyers have any prior
or privileged claim to make that call on behalf of the citizenry at large as
compared to other government officials. After all, that would in effect make
government lawyers their own clients and they would have no greater
responsibility than to take bona fide instructions from themselves.
Accordingly, from a democratic perspective, it can be argued that whether
it is the government generally or the public interest at large that is to be served
by government lawyers, there is no compelling reason why the government
lawyer's view as to what to do should take precedence over the view of elected
officials and/or political superiors. 21 " Of course, government lawyers have a
significant contribution to make in debates within government about how to
19.

Roger C. Cramton, "The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government'
Lawyer" (1991) 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 291 at 296.

20.

The Law Society of Alberta, Code of Professional Conduct,c. 12, r. 1, commentary, C. 1.

21.

For a defence of the position that a lower standard of loyalty is owed by government lawyers
as a result of the public interest or the common good, see Steven K. Berenson, "Public
Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public
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Federal Agency Lawyers," Note, (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1170.
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determine what the public interest demands; they often have the training,
experience, and knowledge to help develop a nuanced and sophisticated
approach to identifying the public interest and crafting a range of practical
strategies for its realization in difficult circumstances. Indeed, being relatively
independent of political pressures and partisan agendas, government lawyers are
well placed to act as trusted advisors to their political superiors. They can adopt
a broader and deeper perspective on how the public interest can be advanced,
anticipate the response of courts to particular arguments and directives, and
caution their political superiors on legal and policy tactics that might backfire.
Nevertheless, it is incumbent on government lawyers to leave the final decision
on what government policy and legal strategy should be adopted and
implemented to elected officials. As such, I can do no better than echo
approvingly the wise words of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks:
Government lawyers, of course, have a wide variety of responsibilities as advisers to
other officials. ... These responsibilities are akin to those of a private lawyer when he
[or she] advises a private client, and they include the same inescapable residuum of
personal responsibility which is inherent in the exercise of any profession. Indeed, in
the case of a government lawyer this personal responsibility not merely to give
accurate advice but to try to guide decision so as to keep it within proper bounds has
a special urgency, for a lawyer's client is not merely the official whose action is
immediately in question but the government of which the official is a part and in
some sense the whole society for which the government speaks. Nevertheless, the
power and the ultimate responsibility of decision in these situations belong to the
official whom the lawyer advises.
The lawyer acts essentially in a staff capacity, and
22
has always to remember this.

Although government lawyers are in a different position than private
lawyers, a useful analogy can be drawn to the context and challenges faced by
those lawyers who represent corporations or other similar organizations. While
it is clear and undisputed that the corporation itself is the client for the
purposes of the lawyer's ethical obligations, it remains less settled as to how this
relationship is to be operationalized in light of the fact that a corporation only
exists as an abstract entity. As a general matter, it can be stated that the lawyer's
ultimate obligation of allegiance is to the corporation itself and not to any of its
officers, shareholders, employees, or other persons who might control the
22.

Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law, ed. by William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 1047.
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corporation.2 3 However, it is plain that corporate lawyers are not entitled to
determine for themselves what is in the best interests of the corporation and
how best to protect or promote those interests. In any dispute or disagreement
about how the corporation should be represented, the individual person
designated to speak on behalf of the corporation by its board of directors has the
first and last call. Corporate lawyers can and should contribute to that debate, but
they are not at liberty simply to prefer their own sense of what is in the
corporation's best interests.2 4 Consequently, like corporate lawyers, government
lawyers would be well advised, on assuming their position as a government lawyer
or accepting any file, to obtain express clarification as to which individuals have
authority to instruct them on behalf of the government or public interest.
If there are good democratic reasons why private lawyers should be
required to defer to their clients' own assessments of their best interests, there
are even stronger reasons why government lawyers should defer to the
assessments of democratically elected and popularly accountable officials as to
what constitutes the public interest. It seems almost axiomatic that if the public
is in the best position to assess the public interest, then its representatives are in
a better position than lawyers to do so. There is a temptation to suggest that
citizens do not always know what is best for them, but this is exactly the kind of
elitist thinking that democracy rejects and seeks to overcome. Like judges,
lawyers can claim no special insight or privilege in evaluating what is in the
public interest. Indeed, also like judges, they might confuse established or
special interests with what is in the public interest, more generally construed.
The legal profession as a whole can hardly be portrayed as a bastion of popular
or progressive thinking or as unerring calculators of the public good.
Historically, they have a mixed record in their efforts to give substance to the
public interest over the years and in particular instances.25 Moreover, apart from

23.

CBA, Code of ProfessionalConduct,supra note 9, c. 5, commentary, C.16.

24.

Nevertheless, as I discuss below, there might well be some extreme circumstances in which
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25.
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their dubious judgment on such matters, any plea by or on behalf of
government lawyers to be allowed to pursue their own rendition of the public
interest over that of their political superiors will also have the effect of holding
the public interest hostage to one more elite group. No matter how well
intentioned that group of government lawyers might be, such a state of affairs
will be almost anathema to the committed democrat.
This stance may well mean that government lawyers will be asked to take
positions or pursue tactics with which they strongly disagree or which they
might think to be against the public interest. This is an institutional price that
will have to be paid, because democracy is not so much about getting the right
answers, insofar as they can ever be said to exist, but about who gets to make
difficult decisions. However, in being required to accede to the lawful
instructions of their political superiors, government lawyers are in no worse
position than private lawyers. Government lawyers' deference regarding the
determination of the public interest to officials with a better democratic
mandate than their own is not as significant a problem as some protest, as there
are often lawyers on the other side or judges who are able to declare such views
of the public interest to be wrong-headed or even illegitimate. Moreover, if
government lawyers find themselves in situations in which they no longer feel
able to represent a certain objectionable position, make a certain objectionable
argument, or pursue a particular legal strategy, they will have to consider
whether they can or should remain in their present employment. Further, there
is no expectation that they breach legal rules or statutory regulations as a matter
of professional responsibility; no professional code allows lawyers to act illegally
under the supposed ethical cover of zealous advocacy.
As with private lawyers, there are no easy answers or solutions to ethical
dilemmas involving government lawyers. It is simply naive or self-deluding to
pretend that legal professionals, be they private lawyers or government lawyers,
can expect to arrange their lives so that they not only always get to do what
they want, but also have such a course of action approved as being ethically
virtuous or even merely acceptable. Being ethical and being a lawyer can be
exacting, inconvenient, and even harmful to the lawyer's own interests. This
ought to come as no surprise because it is what makes law a profession as much
as a business and emphasizes the onerous side of the power-responsibility
equation. While government lawyers may occasionally have to forego their
employment (or at least threaten such a move), they should expect no special
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dispensation in fulfilling the ethical duties and professional responsibilities of
their chosen profession.
VI. CONFIDENTIALITY
Up to now, it might be reasonably thought that, although I have argued that
government lawyers are in a different position than private lawyers and that
their ethical obligations may be correspondingly different, the role and
expectations of government lawyers is no different than those of their private
counterparts-while acting in the public interest, they must ultimately defer to
the views of their superiors as to what ends and means are in the public interest.
However, though government lawyers must act as zealous advocates of the
government's view of the public interest, this does not mean that their other
ethical duties and professional responsibilities will fall entirely into line with
those of private lawyers. If government lawyers are to advance the public
interest (as determined by their political superiors), this will pull in different
directions in crafting the precise impact upon their professional responsibilities
when measured against the private benchmark. In particular, government
lawyers are in a different position when it comes to the demands of
confidentiality. In short, the same democratic-based arguments that
recommend that government lawyers should be the government's zealous
advocates also support the proposal that they should not be under the same
regime of ethical expectations in regard to maintaining confidentiality.
The traditional model of ethical lawyering places a strict duty on private
lawyers to keep their clients' communications on legal matters entirely to
themselves. It inures to the benefit of clients, not lawyers, and can only be
waived with the client's clear approval. Although confidentiality cannot be used
as a cover for criminal communications, the duty prevents lawyers from
utilizing or publicizing information received for their own or anyone else's
benefit. The demands of this duty are relatively uncompromising and can only
be breached by lawyers in exceptional circumstances-to defend themselves
against allegations of criminal conduct, civil liability, or professional
misconduct; to establish or collect their fees; and to avert an imminent risk to
an identifiable person or group of death or serious bodily harm.26 Even when

26. Smith v. Jones, [19 9 9] 1 S.C.R. 455 at para. 77.
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they are permitted to reveal privileged communications, they may only do so in
the most restricted way that least adversely affects their clients' interests.
Moreover, the duty of confidentiality does not expire when the lawyer no
longer represents the client. However, when the rationales offered for enforcing
such a strict duty among private lawyers are examined in the setting of
government lawyers, their application in terms of their force and reach is by no
means readily apparent. Indeed, the reasons for insisting upon such a duty of
confidentiality have far less cogency in regard to government lawyers.
The established basis for the duty is that clients must be able to confer with
their lawyers so as to ascertain and protect their legal rights. In order to obtain
full and frank legal advice, it is considered appropriate that clients should have
no fear that those communications will become public and possibly be used
against them. It is considered that the public interest is best served by placing
such communications outside public scrutiny, even if that might seriously impair
the search for truth: the sanctity of certain relationships (e.g, the lawyer-client
relationship) is deemed to have sufficient social significance to outweigh the
priority given to the ascertainment of truth in the legal process. In the leading
contemporary Canadian case, the Supreme Court offered a convenient
summary of the lawyer-client privilege:
Solicitor-client privilege describes the privilege that exists between a client and his or
her lawyer. This privilege is fundamental to the justice system in Canada. The law is
a complex web of interests, relationships and rules. The integrity of the
administration of justice depends upon the unique role of the solicitor who provides
legal advice to clients within this complex system. At the heart of this privilege lies
be able to speak candidly with their lawyers and so
that people must
the conceptenabe
thir"27
enable their interests to be fully represented.

Although this privilege has considerable, if not irresistible, appeal in the context
of private individuals and their lawyers, especially in the criminal law context, it
loses much of its credibility and gravitas when transferred to the situation of
government lawyers. Insofar as the rule of confidentiality is meant to protect
the 'relatively powerless citizen against the state by ensuring effective legal
representation through open communication, it does not seem either necessary

27. Pritchardv. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809 at para. 17
[Pritchard].The classic statement of this justification is offered by Lord Brougham in
Greenough v. Gaskell(1833), 39 E.R. 618 at 620-21.
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or useful when the government is the putative client being protected.28 While
government business is important, it has no need of such privileges and
protections. The dignity and vulnerability of individuals is not at stake in the
same way. Indeed, the basic democratic commitment to openness and
transparency as a vital prerequisite for accountability suggests that there is very
little role for confidentiality in the affairs of government: confidentiality and
open government do not sit at all well together.
In Pritchard,a disgruntled complainant sought production of an opinion
from the Ontario Human Rights Commission's in-house lawyer. The Court
held that solicitor-client privilege applies "with equal force in the context of
advice given to an administrative board by in-house counsel as it does to advice
given in the realm of private law."29 The Court refused to make any distinction
at all between the role of government lawyers and private lawyers. This is surely
a short-sighted decision. Government lawyers clearly have an obligation to
pursue the public interest, not simply the private interests of their government
client. Although the precise scope of that obligation might well be contentious,
its existence and good sense is surely not. On its facts, it is difficult to
appreciate why the Commission should be able to hide behind lawyer-client
privilege as a way of frustrating the complainant's efforts to learn why her
complaint was rejected. The opinion pertained to a public body's fulfillment of
its explicit public interest mandate; there was no pending litigation where the
recognition might be more compelling. As such, the Court's failure in Pritchard
to recognize any distinction between private lawyers and government lawyers is
regrettable and flies in the face of basic democratic and institutional realities.
After all, the absolute duty of confidentiality is already under steady
criticism in the corporate context, where the broad interpretation of privileged
communications has begun to persuade some commentators and regulators that
it might be desirable to place certain limitations and restrictions on the duty.3"
The need to facilitate the flow of information between the corporate
28.

See Lory A. Barsdate, "Attorney-Client Privilege for the Government Entity" (1988) 97 Yale
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organization, its employees, and its lawyers seems much less compelling than in
the case of the isolated citizen who must deal with the state and its government
departments. Out of concern that the duty is being utilized too easily to hide
corporate mischief and even criminality from appropriate public scrutiny, there
are efforts to restore a greater sense of balance between the need for
confidentiality and the need for publicity so that greater weight is given to the
public interest in determining appropriate occasions of required disclosure or
perhaps noisy withdrawal.31 Consequently, the reasons for maintaining strict
confidentiality in such circumstances are less persuasive.
Similarly, even if there is to be a general duty on government lawyers to keep
confidential communications between themselves and their political superiors
and colleagues, it should be severely curtailed. If there are strong arguments
against protecting the internal workings of corporations from public scrutiny,
there are fewer reasons to do so in the case of governments. In a recent case, the
2
Ontario Court of Appeal held that, based on broad Charte considerations,
government can be obliged to disclose information which falls within the
traditional lawyer-client privilege if there is a strong public interest in so doing;
this was notwithstanding exemptions in pertinent access to information
legislation.33 While this decision speaks to the circumstances in which the
government "client" is obliged to reveal what is otherwise privileged information
(as opposed to the government lawyer), it points in the right democratic
direction. As such, it is preferable to the dubious thrust of the Pritcharddecision.
While it would be inappropriate to move to a situation in which
government lawyers have no responsibility at all to preserve some degree of
confidentiality in their professional activities, the public interest rationale
supports the conclusion that any such duty should certainly cease to apply
where the lawyer is no longer in the employment of the government and, more

31.
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contentiously, even when still in government employ. Moreover, it would be
advisable if former or present government lawyers did not breach confidences
unless they had made a good faith decision that the public disclosure of such
communications was strongly in the public interest. Although this would put
lawyers in the position of determining the public interest (which I frowned
upon and resisted in the context of zealous advocacy), it would only occur
where lawyers were so concerned about public officials' mistaken or perverse
reliance on the public interest that they were prepared to run the risk of
relinquishing their positions as government lawyers. This is a heavy burden and
might convince some that government lawyers should benefit from a lower
threshold at which they would become empowered to blow the whistle on
government misfeasance in regard to the public interest. Nevertheless, the
major thrust of a democratic approach to the duty of confidentiality is that it is
at best a rebuttable presumption."' Government lawyers might well better serve
the public interest by breaking confidentiality than preserving it.
Another beneficial consequence of a looser obligation on government
lawyers to keep confidences is its effect on the relationship between government
lawyers and their political superiors. While government lawyers must be
subservient to elected leaders and political officials in regards to what counts as
the public interest in determining policy ends and legal means, those officials
might begin to feel a little more pressure to ensure that they are acting in good
faith in settling upon the demands of the public interest. Mindful that the
bounds and demands of confidentiality were looser and that government
lawyers might at some point in the future reveal their superiors' inappropriate
motives, those superiors might be inhibited from using the public interest as a
cover for crass or improper purposes. Elected officials would still have at their
disposal the necessary statutory protection of state secrets to ensure that
information held by government lawyers or communications with them that
legitimately jeopardized national security would remain out of the public
domain. However, outside of this special kind of information and
communication, it is entirely in accord with democracy and more attuned to
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the public interest to cultivate a government culture in which openness and
transparency, not secrecy and obfuscation, are the order of the day. In this way,
government lawyers will help citizens to better fulfill their continuing
democratic responsibility to monitor and oversee the operation of government.
VIl. CONCLUSION
If this brief democratic inquiry into the theoretical role and responsibilities of
government lawyers suggests anything, it is that the role and responsibilities of
private lawyers are in need of more serious evaluation and revision. The
democratic arguments as to why lawyers should act as the zealous and loyal
advocates of private interests are not easy to reconcile with the public interest
dimensions of democratic- governance. Although it is undoubtedly in the public
interest that people be free to promote and protect their own private interests,
there is no reason why the vast resources and talents of the legal profession
should be so unconditionally organized and deployed in line with those private
interests. Insofar as there is a mandate for the traditional model of special
friends at all, it would seem that it must be more evenly balanced and calibrated
in favour of a more ample understanding of the public interest. Because the
exclusive advancement of private interests will not always inure to the benefit of
the larger society (except perhaps in the austere imagination of the
unreconstructed free-market theorist), it behooves a democratic society to
realign its stance on legal ethics so that it better incorporates a more public
vision of lawyers' professional role and responsibilities. However, there is no
reason to throw good money after bad by making the ethical obligations of
government lawyers hostage to the traditional model of professional duty, or
even to utilize that model as the only baseline against which to determine and
measure the different role and responsibilities of government lawyers. As their
importance to policy making and policy implementation becomes more
apparent, government lawyers should have their professional responsibilities
and ethical expectations regulated and disciplined with the special
circumstances and conditions of their professional lives clearly in mind.

